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I. INTRODUCTION
Answering the personal jurisdiction question—that is, whether a court 
has power over a party—has required an ever-evolving analysis since the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1878 holding in Pennoyer v. Neff that a state’s exercise
of jurisdiction must be consistent with due process.1 Under Pennoyer, the
due process analysis centered on the state’s power over people and
property, as well as its ability to regulate the status of people and entities 
operating within its borders.2 
While the introduction of due process to the jurisdiction equation was 
an important innovation, Pennoyer’s emphasis on borders has confounded
generations of law students.3 How was it that notice in a local newspaper, 
which an out-of-state resident would probably never see, could permit 
the state to seize his property?4  And why was this form of notice insufficient
in this case? As the United States became increasingly mobile and industrialized, 
the Supreme Court went through various machinations in an attempt to
ease the tension between border-bound notions of state power and a 
changing society.5 
Finally in 1945, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court articulated a new standard: due process is satisfied so long as a 
defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the state such that “the suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”6 
Jurisdiction would no longer be determined by defendants’ property or 
presence, or lack thereof, in a state, but rather whether their contacts with it
made it fair and reasonable for them to defend a suit there.7 
 1.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, “proceedings in
a court of justice to determine personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that 
court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law”). 
 2.  Id.  at 722, 734–35. 
 3.  See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 33, 33–34 (1978). 
 4.  See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727 (“Substituted service by publication, or any other
authorized form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings taken where 
property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act.”). 
 5.  See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202–03 (discussing the difficulties in defining personal 
jurisdiction based on “implied consent to service” and “corporate presence” in an increasingly 
mobile society); see also Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal
Jurisdiction, 71 VAND.L. REV. 1401, 1408 (2018) (noting the struggle of courts and legislatures 
to square economic realities with Pennoyer’s conception of personal jurisdiction).
6. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
 7.  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). 
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For the next forty-five years, International Shoe’s minimum contacts 
framework guided the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis.8 But in 1990, 
Pennoyer’s focus on physical presence resurfaced in Burnham v. Superior 
Court.9 In a plurality decision by Justice Scalia, the Court held that 
jurisdiction based on personal service of process over a nonresident
defendant who happens to be within a state’s borders satisfies due process 
because of long standing tradition preceding even Pennoyer.10 Justice Scalia
observed, “Among the most firmly established principles of personal 
jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.”11 
Although it took twenty years before the Court next considered personal 
jurisdiction,12 the focus on Pennoyer’s traditional bases of jurisdiction that 
began with Burnham took off. For instance, in the 2011 case of J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a plurality of the Court described jurisdiction 
as a matter of state authority, not fairness.13  And in Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court, decided in 2017, the majority framed restrictions 
on jurisdiction as a consequence of “territorial limitations” on state power.14 
This revived focus on state borders has resulted in the Court striking down 
six instances of a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant.15 
This Article argues that the Court’s recent decisions have effectively 
revived Pennoyer’s focus on physical presence and status, at the expense
of the fairness and contact considerations set forth in International Shoe, 
 8.  See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1984); Shaffer, 
433 U.S. at 212 (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must 
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe . . . .”); McGee v. 
Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). 
 9.  See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
10. See id. at 607, 610–16, 619 (plurality opinion) (“[J]urisdiction based on physical 
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our 
legal system . . . .”).
11. Id. at 610. 
12. Steinman, supra note at 5, 1410–11. 
13. 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plurality opinion).
14. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958)).
15. See id. at 1781; BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017); Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 279 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121–22 (2014); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–20 (2011); McIntyre, 
564 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion). 
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as the bases for asserting personal jurisdiction. Part II details the jurisdictional 
analysis under both Pennoyer and International Shoe.16 Part III discusses 
the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine under International Shoe.17 
Part IV demonstrates that the Court’s recent decisions have revitalized
Pennoyer’s territorially based regime, and consequently diminished the 
thrust of International Shoe.18 
II. PENNOYER AND INTERNATIONAL SHOE: THE PARADIGMS OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part describes the two paradigmatic approaches to personal
jurisdiction: physical presence and status under Pennoyer v. Neff19 and 
minimum contacts and fairness under International Shoe Co. v. Washington.20 
Section A details Pennoyer’s territorially bound conception of personal 
jurisdiction. Section B describes the tensions between Pennoyer’s territorially 
based approach and an increasingly mobile society. Section C explains 
the expansive contacts-focused approach to personal jurisdiction ushered
in by International Shoe. 
A. Phase One: Pennoyer
The controversy in Pennoyer surrounded the validity of an Oregon court’s
judgment resulting in the sale of property owned by Neff, a nonresident, 
to Pennoyer.21 Although Neff was neither personally served with process 
nor appeared in the state, the Oregon court claimed jurisdiction pursuant 
to a statute that authorized service of process via publication to nonresident 
property owners like Neff.22 While the appellate court struck down the
judgment based on perceived defects in service, the Supreme Court focused
on the lower court’s jurisdictional reach.23 The Supreme Court held that
16. See infra notes 19–83 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 84–142 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 155–233 and accompanying text. 
19. 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
20.  326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719. The underlying litigation that resulted in the sale began 
when J.H. Mitchell sued Neff for unpaid legal fees. Id. at 717. The court awarded Mitchell 
less than $300. Id. at 719. Neff’s land sold in satisfaction of the judgment was allegedly
worth $15,000.  Id.
22. Id. at 719–20. Mitchell and his attorneys issued a summons pursuant to the statute.  
See id. at 717. The summons ran for six weeks in a weekly newspaper that circulated in 
the county in which Neff’s land was situated.  Id.
23. Id. at 719–22. 
584
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because the Oregon court did not attach Neff’s property prior to rendering 
judgment against him, the court lacked jurisdiction.24 
The Court’s analysis began with “two well-established principles of public
law.”25 First, states have “exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property” within their borders.26 Second, states cannot exercise “direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property” outside their borders.27 
Therefore, if a state seeks to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident,
the nonresident must either be personally served with process within state
borders or own property within the state.28 
While neither of these principles were remarkable, Pennoyer innovated
personal jurisdiction doctrine by linking a state’s exercise of power to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Pennoyer defined due 
process as “a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and
principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence 
for the protection and enforcement of private rights.”30 The process that
is due varies based on the nature of the action. 
Where an action concerns the “personal rights and obligations of the 
defendant,” the proceeding is in personam,31 whereas actions concerning 
24. Id. at 720, 736. Because the Oregon court never obtained jurisdiction—either 
by attachment or otherwise—over Neff’s property before rendering the judgment, the
judgment was in personam, meaning that the action concerned Neff’s personal rights and 
obligations. Id. at 727, 734. Because Neff was not personally served, the judgment against him
violated due process. See id. at 736 (“The question here respects only the validity of a money 
judgment rendered in one State, in an action upon a simple contract against the resident of
another, without service of process upon him . . . .”). 
25. Id. at 722. 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 723–24 (“It is in virtue of the State’s jurisdiction over the property of 
the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident’s
obligations to its own citizens . . . . If the non-resident have no property in the State, there 
is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate.”).
29. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (noting that American
courts refused to recognize judgments where jurisdiction was lacking “long before the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,” and, “[i]n Pennoyer v. Neff, . . . we announced that 
the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (citation omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.”).
30. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
31. Id. at 727. 
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property or an interest therein are in rem.32  For proceedings in rem, due
process allows for constructive—fictional—service of process based on 
the theory that “property is always in the possession of its owner, in person
or by agent.”33 Accordingly, so long as the court obtains jurisdiction over
the property and the summons meets the state’s notice requirements, whether 
the defendant actually appears is irrelevant.34 This rationale does not apply
to matters in personam because it is unlikely defendants would ever see the 
summons, and even if they did, the state has no way to compel them to appear.35 
Although the thrust of the Court’s analysis focused on the defendant’s
physical presence and property in the state,36 the Court also provided for
jurisdiction based on “status,” possibly recognizing the limitations of borders.37 
First, the Court noted that every state has jurisdiction “to determine the 
civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants.”38 Therefore, a state has 
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage—the status of being married—where a
spouse is absent because the aggrieved spouse would otherwise be left
without recourse.39  Second, states may require nonresidents seeking to enter
partnerships, associations, or contracts within their borders to appoint 
a representative to receive service so as to maintain state power.40 Finally, 
states have the power to regulate corporations so there is “a mode in which
their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their 
charter revoked.”41 These status-based theories assume consent to jurisdiction.42 
32. See id. at 726–27.  Essentially, a matter in rem is an action to determine title to
or status of real property. Id. at 714. 
33. Id. at 727 (comparing the need for personal service of process for in personam
actions with service by publication for matters relating to property). 
34. See id. But see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (holding that notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections”). 
35. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727 (“[W]here the suit is merely in personam, 
constructive service . . . upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose. . . . Publication
of process or notice within the State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation 
upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and process published
within it, are equally unavailing.”).
36. See id. at 722–34 (discussing jurisdiction in personam and in rem). 
37. See id. at 734–36 (observing that states may determine the “status of one of its 
citizens towards a non-resident,” and to make requirements of partnerships, associations, 
and corporations doing business within their borders).
38. Id. at 734. 
39. Id. at 734–35. 
40. See id. at 735 (explaining that a state can require nonresidents operating or contracting 
within its borders to appoint an agent to receive service of process or notice of proceedings). 
41. Id.
42. See id. (noting that it is just to require an individual who has agreed to a mode
of service to be bound by a judgment so served); see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & ALAN N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1066, at 354–56
586
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B. Problems with Pennoyer
The Court’s allowance for status-based jurisdiction in Pennoyer foreshadowed
the limitations of a jurisdictional regime driven by territorial boundaries 
in an increasingly complex and mobile world.43 Two cases in particular 
highlight the odd results this regime engendered: Harris v. Balk44 and Hess
v. Pawloski.45 
Harris concerned the validity of exercising jurisdiction based on the
attachment of debt.46  Harris, a North Carolina resident, owed Balk, another
North Carolina resident, $180.47 Balk owed Epstein, a Maryland native, 
$300.48 When Harris was visiting Baltimore, Epstein attached the $180
debt Harris owed to Balk and garnished it.49 Balk’s debt was considered 
property found within Maryland’s borders.50 Balk subsequently sued Harris
for the $180 in North Carolina, arguing that the Maryland court’s judgment
was invalid because the debt arose in North Carolina.51 
The Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s exercise of jurisdiction based 
on the notion that, “The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to 
and accompanies him wherever he goes.”52 Because the debt was thought
to be a form of property, the attachment of it was in rem. Thus, Balk did 
not need to be personally served with process because he had property, in 
(4th ed. 2015) (noting that Justice Field, the author of the Court’s opinion in Pennoyer, 
articulated the consent theory based on the idea that a corporation had no inherent right to
do business in a state under then existing interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Constitution).
43. See Steinman, supra note 5, at 1408 (noting that prior to International Shoe, 
“courts and legislatures struggled to fit new social realities . . . into notions of jurisdiction
that fixated on the defendant’s ‘presence’ in the territory . . . .” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)). 
44.  198 U.S. 215 (1905), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
45.  274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
46. Harris, 198 U.S. at 216. 
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.  A Maryland statute permitted attachment of debts. Id. Regarding the statute,
the Court said, “If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt, then
if the garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally served upon him therein, 
we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him.” Id. at 222. 
50. See id. at 223; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977) (“This Court 
reasoned that the debt Harris owed Balk was an intangible form of property belonging to 
Balk, and that the location of that property traveled with the debtor.”). 
51. See Harris, 198 U.S. at 216–17, 221. 
52. Id. at 222. 
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the form of Harris’ debt to him, in Maryland.53 That Harris had been personally 
served was enough to give Balk notice of the suit.54 
The Hess case, while more conceptually comprehensible, required its 
own legal fiction.55  In Hess, the Court examined a Massachusetts statute
that permitted the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident 
who caused an automobile accident.56 Specifically, the statute provided 
that by driving on Massachusetts’ roads, nonresidents named the registrar 
of motor vehicles as their agent to receive service of process for any claims 
related to their driving.57 Hess claimed that the statute deprived him of due
process, but the Court was unpersuaded.58 Instead, the Court found the 
statute to be a reasonable exercise of the state’s power to regulate use of 
its roadways.59 The Court also held that there is little difference between 
requiring an individual to formally appoint an agent for service as opposed 
to impliedly doing so.60 Because an earlier case held that a state could 
53. See id. at 223 (reasoning that because debt is intangible “[n]otice to the debtor
(garnishee) of the commencement of the suit, and notice not to pay his creditor, is all that 
can be given”); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (allowing for constructive
service of process for matters in rem because “law assumes that property is always in the
possession of its owner”), overruled in part by Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. 
54. See Harris, 198 U.S. at 226. Balk had notice of the attachment because he sued
Harris in North Carolina within a few days of his return from Baltimore, at which point 
Harris presented the Maryland court’s judgment. Id. at 228. Balk did not contest the Maryland
court’s judgment directly.  Id.
55. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202 (“The advent of automobiles, with the concomitant
increase in the incidence of individuals causing injury in States where they were not subject to
in personam actions under Pennoyer, required further modification of the territorial limits 
on jurisdictional power.”).
56. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 353–54 (1927).  Pawloski sued Hess, a Pennsylvania
resident, for negligently operating a motor vehicle.  Id. at 353. 
57. Id. at 354. The statute read: 
[T]he operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public way in the
commonwealth . . . shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-
resident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding 
against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which said non-resident 
may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way, and said acceptance
or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process 
against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if 
served on him personally.
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 431, § 2 (1923)). The statute also required plaintiffs to 
send notice of service to the defendant and to produce an affidavit to that effect. Id.
(quoting § 2). 
58.  Id. at 354, 356. 
59. Id. at 356. 
60. Id. at 357 (“The difference between the formal and implied appointment [of an
agent on whom process may be served] is not substantial so far as concerns . . . the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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formally require motorists to name an agent for service of process, there 
was no reason a state could not do so impliedly.61 
Following Hess, states enacted various statutes regulating the activity of
nonresidents.62 Laws regulating the operation of aircraft and watercraft, 
the sale of securities, and construction work broadened personal jurisdiction 
beyond the traditional boundaries envisioned by Pennoyer.63 Yet the traditional 
framework remained, leaving the issue ripe for reconsideration by the Court. 
C. Phase Two: International Shoe
While personal jurisdiction based on implied consent to service proved
simple enough to regulate, the legal fictions that permitted the exercise of 
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations created more difficulties.64 
Courts grappled with what it means for a corporation to be present within 
a state, leading to a multitude of decisions interpreting whether the corporation
was “doing business.”65 By the time International Shoe came before the
Court, there was no discernible rule to follow.66 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided to tell it like it was.
Consent, either real or implied, amounts to the defendant’s contacts within
the state.67 Therefore, a nonresident defendant may be subject to in personam
jurisdiction if “he ha[as] certain minimum contacts with [the state] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”68 Additionally, because due process is implicated
by a state’s exercise of jurisdiction, fairness must be considered.  The
fairness inquiry depends “upon the quality and nature of the activity [of 
the defendant] in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws 
61. Id. at 356–57 (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)). 
62. See 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1065. 
63. Id.
64. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977). 
65. Id.; see 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1066. 
66. 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1066, at 360 (“[I]t became 
apparent that ‘it is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases; we must
step from tuft to tuft across the morass.’” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,
45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930))). 
67. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (noting that consent
traditionally was implied by the presence of a corporation’s authorized agents in the state, 
“[b]ut more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as 
to justify the action” (citing Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 
(S.D.N.Y. 1915))).
68. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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which it was the purpose of the due process clause to ensure.”69  Whereas
Pennoyer defined due process in terms of tradition, International Shoe
contemplated a fact-specific inquiry grounded in fairness.70 
Among the relevant fairness considerations are the benefits and privileges 
a corporation receives from doing business within a state.71  Thus, in
considering whether the state of Washington could sue International Shoe 
Company for unpaid contributions to the state’s unemployment fund, the
Court examined the company’s contacts with the state.72 The Court held that
the privilege of doing a “large volume of interstate business” in Washington 
with the state’s sanction and protection, combined with its continuous and
systematic contacts from which the unemployment payments were owed,
supported jurisdiction.73 
The Court also distinguished between instances in which the number of 
contacts, as opposed to the nature of the claim, support jurisdiction. In 
some cases, the corporation’s activities may be “so substantial and of such
a nature as to justify” the maintenance of a claim on matters unrelated to 
its activities.74 Such jurisdiction came to be known as “general jurisdiction.”75 
Conversely, where the corporation has only a “casual” presence in the
forum, the claim must be related to its activities for the state to assert 
jurisdiction.76 In these instances, courts exercise “specific jurisdiction.”77 
Interestingly, the Court suggested that there may be instances in which
fewer contacts support jurisdiction despite minimal connection between
69. Id. at 319. 
70. See id. (rejecting “mechanical or quantitative” analyses of jurisdiction); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (defining due process as “a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights”), overruled in part by 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
71. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
72. Id. at 311, 320. Washington’s Unemployment Compensation Act provided for 
personal service of process for orders and notices of assessment for unpaid contributions 
within the state or service via registered mail to the employer’s last known address.  Id. at
311–12. The notice was personally served upon a sales solicitor in the state and was also
mailed to International Shoe’s principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at
312. International Shoe was incorporated in Delaware, had no offices in Washington, and
kept no stock of its product within Washington.  Id. at 311, 313.  Between the years 1937 
and 1940—the years for which unemployment compensation was owed—it had a sales
force of eleven to thirteen individuals who were managed by the St. Louis office. Id. at
313. 
73. Id. at 320. 
74. Id. at 318. 
75. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1409 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984)).
76. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
77. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1409. 
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the contacts and the defendant’s activities.78 But beyond the observation
that the “boundary line” between activities that support the maintenance 
of jurisdiction and those that do not “cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative,”
the Court did not elaborate.79 As this Article will demonstrate, the gray 
area between general and specific jurisdiction has caused much judicial
consternation.80 
Justice Hugo Black, in a concurring opinion, upheld Washington’s assertion 
of jurisdiction, but objected to the majority’s reasoning as needlessly
inviting judicial interpretation of state power.81 According to Justice Black, 
introducing words like “‘reasonableness,’ ‘justice,’ or ‘fair play,’ makes judges 
the supreme arbiters of this country’s laws and practices.”82  As a result,
“tomorrow’s judgment may strike down a State or Federal enactment on 
the ground that it does not conform to this Court’s idea of natural justice.”83 
As it happens, Justice Black’s observation was prescient. 
78. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318–19. 
79. See id. at 319. 
80. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[B]y refusing
to consider any distinction between controversies that ‘relate to’ a defendant’s contacts 
with the forum and causes of action that ‘arise out of’ such contacts, the Court may
be placing severe limitations on the type and amount of contacts that will satisfy the
constitutional minimum.”). In Helicopteros, the majority did not consider specific
jurisdiction, nor did it find enough contacts to support an exercise of general jurisdiction.
See id. at 415–16 (majority opinion). Justice Brennan believed the defendant’s contacts
with the forum were “sufficiently important, and sufficiently related to the underlying 
cause of action, to make it fair and reasonable” for the forum to exercise jurisdiction. Id. 
at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175
Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 429 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to define “what
it means for a suit to ‘arise out of’ or ‘relate’ to a defendant’s contacts with the state”), 
aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). Given this void, 
the California Supreme Court developed its own test for specific jurisdiction in these 
instances—“whether the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with”
defendant’s activity in the forum, combined with party convenience and the state’s interest 
in litigating the dispute. Bristol-Myers, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 429 (quoting Vons Cos. v. 
Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Cal. 1996)). 
81. See Int’l Shoe, 326 at 322–26 (Black, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 326 (first citing Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17–18 (1938) (Black, J., 
dissenting); and then citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,
600 & n.4 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., concurring)). 
83. Id.
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III. INTERPRETING INTERNATIONAL SHOE
International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis initially supported 
expansive findings of jurisdiction. It has since undergone significant
refinement. Section A discusses developments in specific jurisdiction,
including the concept of purposeful availment, the stream of commerce
theory, the court’s elaboration of “fair play and substantial justice,” and
jurisdiction for intentional torts. Section B details developments in general 
jurisdiction. Section C discusses the refinement of property concepts under 
International Shoe and its progeny.
A. Specific Jurisdiction 
The requirements for exercising specific jurisdiction have developed 
over time from requiring very little contact between the defendant, the
claim, and the forum, to substantial contact between the three.84  The liberality
with which the Court first approached the issue is demonstrated by McGee 
v. International Life Insurance Co.85  In McGee, a unanimous Court upheld
a California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance
company based on a single life insurance contract.86 Although International
Life had never solicited any business in California aside from the single
policy at issue, the Court noted a “clearly discernible” trend of expanding
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.87  So although the Court recognized
that requiring International Life to defend the suit in California would be 
inconvenient, it held that the inconvenience did not outweigh California’s
interest in providing relief for its citizens.88 
84. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75– 
77 (2018) (comparing the Court’s relaxation of the “nexus” between the defendant and the 
forum with its more recent restrictive approach).
85.  355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
86. See id. at 223. Lulu B. McGee sued International Life in California to recover 
the proceeds of her son’s insurance policy. Id. at 221–22. A California statute permitted 
the exercise of jurisdiction over insurance contracts made with California residents. Id. at
221. 
87. Id. at 222. International Life acquired the insurance policy after it purchased 
another insurance company. Id. at 221. Following the acquisition, International Life mailed a 
certificate of reinsurance to McGee’s son in California. Id. He accepted the policy and
mailed premiums from his home in California to International Life’s Texas office until his
death. Id. at 221–22. 
88. See id. at 223–24 (discussing the remedial nature of California’s insurance statute 
and the “severe disadvantage” residents would face in having to defend against an insurance
company in a distant state as compared to International Life’s inconvenience).
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1. Purposeful Availment 
A year after McGee, the Court added an additional criterion to the 
minimum contacts analysis: purposeful availment.89 Purposeful availment,
or the defendant’s action of invoking the “benefits and protections” of
the forum state, emerged in Hanson v. Denckla.90 The case concerned the
validity of a Florida court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Delaware trust.91 
The Supreme Court found that Florida could not exercise jurisdiction over
the trust because it conducted no business in the state.92  The Court
distinguished the trust from the insurance contract in McGee by noting 
that the insurance company had solicited the contract in the forum state,
whereas the trust had no connection to Florida.93 Although the trustee sent
payments to Florida after the settlor moved there, the Court found that “[t]he
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident 
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state.”94 
Rather, the defendant must commit some act targeted toward the proposed 
forum.95 
While the Hanson decision created much controversy, the concept of
purposeful availment became a touchstone in the Court’s later decisions.96 
For instance, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court rejected
an Oklahoma court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a New York-based Audi 
dealer, distinguishing between the concepts of foreseeability and purposeful 
89. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case 
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))). 
90. Id.
91. Id. at 238. The facts of the case were fairly complex and are presented in an
abbreviated fashion here. In 1935, Dora Browning Donner, a Pennsylvania resident, executed
a trust instrument naming a Delaware bank trustee. Id.  In 1944, Mrs. Donner moved from 
Pennsylvania to Florida, where she lived until her death in 1952. Id. at 239. Following
her death, Mrs. Donner’s estate was probated in a Florida court, with her daughter Elizabeth
Donner Hanson serving as executor of the estate. Id. at 239–40. Pursuant to the residual 
clause of the trust, Ms. Hanson appointed the remaining $400,000 in the trust to her two
children. Id. at 240. At this point, Mrs. Donner’s two other daughters, Katherine N.R. Denckla
and Dorothy B.R. Stewart, challenged Elizabeth Hanson’s power of appointment. See id.
92. Id. at 251. 
93. Id. at 251–52. 
94. Id. at 253. 
95. See id. (requiring the defendant to “purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State”). 
96. See generally 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1067.1. 
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availment.97 The Oklahoma Supreme Court had upheld jurisdiction based 
on an automobile’s inherent mobility and an inference that the dealer
derived income from automobiles used in the state.98 Rejecting this 
argument, the U.S. Supreme Court held that foreseeability relevant to the
due process analysis derives from purposeful availment in the form of 
defendant’s efforts to target the particular market.99 Where a defendant 
“delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation 
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State,” then the 
state’s exercise of jurisdiction is proper.100 The mere fact that a product
might end up in a state is not enough to support jurisdiction.101 It should 
be noted that in dicta the Court clearly indicated that a manufacturer or 
distributor who has targeted many states with its product may be subject
to jurisdiction in each.102 
2. The Stream of Commerce 
The stream of commerce theory mentioned in World-Wide Volkswagen
took center stage in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.103 
A California resident sued Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese tube manufacturer,
following a fatal motorcycle accident.104 Cheng Shin subsequently sought
to indemnify Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s valve assembly.105 
Although Asahi had essentially no contact with the state of California,
a lower court held that Asahi’s act of placing its products into the stream of
97. 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen was a products liability 
action brought by Harry and Kay Robinson after their Audi crashed and burst into flames, 
causing serious burns to Kay Robinson and the couple’s children. Id. at 288. The
Robinsons’ only connection to Oklahoma was that the accident had happened there—they 
previously lived in New York and were in the process of moving to Arizona at the time of
the accident. See id.  Apparently, juries in the county in which the crash occurred were 
known to be sympathetic to personal injury plaintiffs. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA
C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 112 (9th ed. 2016). In order to prevent removal to federal 
court, Seaway, the regional Audi-dealer and a New York resident, had to remain a party
to the case. Id.
98. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 290. 
99. See id. at 297. 
100. Id. at 297–98. 
101. See id. at 298. 
102. See id. at 297 (“[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is
not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable 
to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there 
been the source of injury to its owner or to others.”).
103. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
104. Id. at 105–06 (plurality opinion). 
105. Id. at 106. 
594
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commerce, knowing that some of those products would end up in California,
made it amenable to suit in the state.106 
A unanimous Supreme Court held that California’s exercise of jurisdiction 
was improper, but the justices split in their interpretation of the stream of 
commerce theory.107 Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell 
and Scalia, Justice O’Connor found that merely placing a product into the 
stream of commerce, without more, does not constitute purposeful availment.108 
Rather, the defendant must demonstrate an intent to target the particular 
market, which may be manifested by advertising in the forum, establishing
channels of distribution, and the like.109 
Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s opinion emphasized various factors that 
made California’s exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable.110 Chief among 
these was the fact that the litigation, at the point it reached the Court, was 
primarily an indemnification action between a Taiwanese corporation and 
a Japanese corruption.111 As such, the burden on Asahi to defend the suit would 
be severe and both Cheng Shin and the state of California had minimal interest
in litigating the dispute in California.112 
Justice Brennan rejected the idea that the stream of commerce requires 
something more to establish jurisdiction.113 Relying on World-Wide
Volkswagen, Justice Brennan articulated the view that the stream of commerce 
merely requires the defendant’s awareness that its product is marketed 
in the forum state.114 Accordingly, Asahi’s numerous sales to a manufacturer
that made regular sales to California sufficed to establish minimum contacts.115 
Despite these minimum contacts, Justice Brennan concurred with Justice 
106. See id. at 106–07. 
107. See id. at 103–04 (explaining that all the justices joined with the Court’s conclusion
in Part II-B of the opinion, which found the exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable). 
108.  Id. at 102, 112. 
109. See id. at 112. 
110. See id. at 113–16. 
111. Id. at 114. The original plaintiff’s claims against Cheng Shin and other defendants 
had been settled and dismissed.  Id. at 106. 
112. Id. at 116. Although the justices thought that California’s interest in the suit was 
minimal, the California Supreme Court had argued that the state had an interest in “protecting
its consumers by ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with the state’s safety standards.”
Id. at 114 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 553 (Cal. 1985), 
rev’d, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
113. Id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
114. See id. at 118–21. 
115. Id. at 121. 
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O’Connor’s reasonableness analysis.116 Justice Brennan viewed Asahi as 
the “rare” case in which a corporate defendant that purposefully availed itself 
of a forum is not subject to jurisdiction due to fair play and substantial justice
117concerns. 
3. Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts inquiry ensures that “maintenance
of [a] suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice,’” by preventing unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction.118  In World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Court directly equated fair play and substantial justice 
with reasonableness and fairness, and drawing on precedent, set forth additional
factors beyond the burden on the defendant that bear on the inquiry.119 
These factors include: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute,” (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,” (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies,” and (4) “the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”120 
In Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, Justice Brennan, a stalwart proponent
of the fairness considerations articulated in International Shoe, finally got
the opportunity to write a majority opinion.121 The Court suggested that
the factors named in World-Wide Volkswagen “sometimes serve to establish
the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required.”122  In effect, Justice Brennan 
established a sliding scale wherein the more reasonable it is for the forum 
116. Id. at 116 (“I do agree [] with the Court’s conclusion . . . that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Asahi in this case would not comport with ‘fair play and substantial
justice.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))). 
117. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)). 
118. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)).
119. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting 
that the relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that the exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable). 
120. Id.  These are the factors Justice O’Connor considered in her Asahi reasonableness 
analysis. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion). 
121. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463–87; see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Ideology, 
Due Process, and Civil Procedure, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 265, 299, 304–07 (1993) (describing
Justice Brennan’s rejection of purposeful availment and embrace of International Shoe’s
focus on fairness and reasonableness). 
122. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. In Burger King, a Michigan-based defendant 
challenged Florida’s assertion of jurisdiction over its franchise agreement with Burger
King Corporation. See id. at 463–66. The franchise agreement contained a forum selection 
clause, which provided Florida law would govern the contract.  Id. at 465–66. 
596
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to assert jurisdiction, the less contacts are required.123 Under this model,
a defendant who has purposefully availed itself of the forum is presumed
to be subject to jurisdiction.124 Of course, Justice Brennan’s conception
of purposeful availment was sufficiently more expansive than most of his
colleagues.125 
4. Intentional Torts 
Initially, the Court’s analysis of intentional tort claims suggested a
willingness to extend jurisdiction based on fairness considerations and the 
location of the victim’s injury.126 More recent cases suggest that this
theory is no longer viable in personal injury actions.127 But in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., fair play and substantial justice concerns, as opposed
123. Vandevelde, supra note 121, at 306. 
124. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. In fact, the Court afforded little consideration to
the reasonableness factors given that the defendant deliberately “reached” into the forum 
state. See id. at 479–80, 482–85 (“Nor has [Defendant] pointed to other factors that can 
be said persuasively . . . to establish the unconstitutionality of Florida’s assertion of
jurisdiction.”).
125. See Vandevelde, supra note 121, at 291–92, 296–97 (noting Justice Brennan’s 
resistance to the notion of purposeful availment in Hanson v. Denckla and Shaffer v. Heitner).
126. See infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984) (finding jurisdiction proper based on the effects of the defendant’s 
conduct in the forum). In Calder, Shirley Jones, an actress, sued the National Enquirer, 
its local distributing company, and two of its employees, South and Calder, for libel, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in a California court. Id. at 784– 
85. South and Calder were both Florida residents and had worked on the story in Florida.  
Id. at 785–86. Aside from South’s frequent business trips and calls to California and 
Calder’s two visits to the state, neither had relevant contacts with the state. Id. at 786. The 
defendants argued that the foreseeability of the article’s circulation in California was
insufficient to support jurisdiction. Id. at 789. The Court disagreed, finding that their actions 
were “expressly aimed” at California because the article “concerned the California activities of
a California resident,” whose acting career was based in California. Id. at 788–89. 
Additionally, the article’s sources were from California and “the brunt of the harm . . . was
suffered in California.” Id. The Calder effects test that emerged from the decision permits 
courts to exercise jurisdiction where a defendant intentionally and wrongfully aims 
tortious conduct at a state. Anderson Bailey, Note, Purposefully Directed: Foreign 
Judgments and the Calder Effects Test for Specific Jurisdiction, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 671, 677 (2007).
127. Compare Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017) (rejecting a California court’s assertion of jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s injury
did not occur in the state), with J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 
(2011) (plurality opinion) (denying a New Jersey court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant whose product injured the plaintiff in the forum state).
597
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to the location of the injury, figured prominently in the Court’s analysis of a
New Hampshire court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a libel action.128  Keeton,
a resident of New York, sued Hustler Magazine, an Ohio corporation with
its principal place of business in California, in New Hampshire because
of the state’s lengthy statute of limitations.129 Beginning with the minimum
contacts analysis, the Court found that Hustler’s monthly magazine sales
in the state could not “be characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous,” 
making it “unquestionable” that a complaint based on these contacts would
ordinarily satisfy due process.130 
Upon finding sufficient minimum contacts, the Court then engaged in a
fairness analysis centered on New Hampshire’s interest in litigating the 
dispute.131  Although the plaintiff was not a New Hampshire resident, the
Court found that the state had a significant interest in the matter because 
libelous statements harm both the subject and the reader wherever they
are circulated.132  The Court concluded its analysis by noting that Hustler
targets a nationwide audience; thus, “[t]here is no unfairness in calling it 
to answer for the contents of that publication wherever a substantial number 
of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”133 
B. General Jurisdiction 
Following International Shoe, the Supreme Court first considered general 
jurisdiction in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.134 The case
concerned an Ohio court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Benguet Consolidated
128. 465 U.S. 770, 775–76 (1984) (considering the fairness of haling an out-of-state 
defendant into court). 
129. Id. at 772–73. Because of its six-year statute of limitations, New Hampshire
was the only state in which Keeton’s claim was not time-barred. Id. at 773. 
130. Id. at 774. Hustler sold between 10,000 and 15,000 copies of its magazine per
month in the state. Id. at 772. 
131. Id. at 775–76; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980) (listing the “forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute” as a relevant
factor bearing on the reasonableness of jurisdiction). The Court also suggested that judicial 
economy favored New Hampshire’s exercise of jurisdiction because New Hampshire
provided a single forum in which all issues and damages could be litigated. Keeton, 465
U.S. at 777; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (listing “the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies” as a reasonableness
factor).
132. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776–77 (finding the state interest in preventing wrongful 
conduct within its borders extends to nonresidents). Even if a libel plaintiff has previously
been anonymous in a state, he or she may still suffer reputational injury there. Id. at 777. 
133. Id. at 781. 
134. 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, 
§ 1067.5, at 510 (citing Perkins as the “roots of contemporary doctrine of ‘general jurisdiction’”).
598
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Mining Company, a Philippine’s corporation.135 During the Japanese occupation 
of the Philippines, the company’s mining operations stopped and the interim 
president of the company returned to his home in Ohio, where he continued 
to act as president and general manager.136 Although the president’s
activities constituted only a limited portion of the company’s business, the
Court found the activities were sufficiently continuous and systematic to
support maintenance of a suit, despite no discernable connection to the 
cause of action in Ohio.137 
It took thirty years before the Court next considered general jurisdiction 
in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.138  Following
a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four U.S. citizens, the surviving 
family members brought wrongful-death actions in Texas district court.139 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia (Helicol), the Colombia-based
corporation that owned the helicopter involved in the crash, challenged 
jurisdiction.140 After concluding that the claims did not “arise out of”
activities that took place in Texas, the Court proceeded to examine whether
the company engaged in continuous and systematic activities in the forum.141 
Although Helicol purchased more than $4 million worth of helicopters and 
equipment from another helicopter company in Fort Worth, Texas, and sent
its prospective pilots there for training, the Court found such contacts
135. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438–39. Idonah Slade Perkins, a stockholder of Benguet, 
sued the company claiming she was owed over $2,500,000.  Id.
136. Id. at 447–48.  While in Ohio, the president kept files for the company; carried 
on correspondence related to the business and its employees; drew and distributed salary checks
for himself and two company secretaries who worked with him; used and maintained two 
bank accounts; held directors’ meetings; supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation
of the company’s properties; and dispatched funds to cover purchases of machinery in support 
of rehabilitation. Id. at 448. 
137. Id. at 438. 
138. 
at 510. 
466 U.S. 408 (1984); 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1067.5, 
139. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410, 412. The decedents were employees of a joint 
venture that had contracted with a Peruvian state-owned oil company to build an oil pipeline. 
Id. at 410. The joint venture purchased helicopters from Helicol to move employees, material,
and equipment around the construction site.  Id.
140. Id. at 409–10, 412. 
141. Id. at 415–16. The majority thought that the respondents had conceded the issue
of specific jurisdiction. Id. at 415. In the dissent, however, Justice Brennan argued that 
the majority failed to consider the distinction between claims relating to a defendant’s contacts
as opposed to those arising out of such contacts. Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Brennan found the claims sufficiently related to Helicol’s Texas activities to support the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction. See id. at 426. 
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insufficient to support general jurisdiction.142   The ruling foreshadowed the 
more restrictive approach to come. 
C. Property Concepts 
In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court distinguished between the due 
process requirements for actions in personam versus those in rem.143  In
Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court revisited, and ultimately rejected, this categorical 
approach to the due process analysis.144 
As in Pennoyer, the controversy in Shaffer surrounded an attachment of 
property. In this shareholder’s derivative suit, a Delaware court attached
stock owned by the individually named defendants in order to gain jurisdiction 
over them.145 Although the stock certificates were not physically present
in the state, a statute deemed Delaware the place of ownership for all stock 
in Delaware corporations.146 The Delaware courts rejected the individuals’ 
challenge to jurisdiction based on the belief that attachment of property, 
142. Id. at 411, 416–17. Helicol also sent its chief executive officer to Houston,
Texas, to attend a negotiation session related to the Peruvian joint venture. See id. at 410.  
And in addition to sending its pilots for training in Fort Worth, Texas, Helicol also sent its 
management and maintenance personnel. Id. at 411. Helicol also received over $5 million
in payments from the joint venture’s Texas bank.  Id.
143. 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (comparing the need for personal service of process for
in personam actions with service by publication for matters relating to property), overruled in
part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
144. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (describing the distinction between jurisdiction 
over the person and jurisdiction over the person’s property as a “fiction”).
145. See id. at 189–93. Heitner, the plaintiff, brought the shareholder derivative suit
against Greyhound Corporation, its subsidiary, and twenty-eight present or former directors of
the corporations. Id. at 189–90. According to Heitner, who owned one share of Greyhound
stock, the individual defendants caused Greyhound and its subsidiary to incur substantial 
financial losses as a result of an antitrust lawsuit and a criminal contempt matter.
Id. Pursuant to a Delaware sequestration statute, Heitner made a motion to have the stock 
of the individual defendants seized.  Id. at 190.  The court approved Heitner’s motion and
took possession of 82,000 shares of stock as well as options belonging to twenty-one of
the defendants. Id. at 191–92. Notice of the suit was published in a local paper and mailed 
to the defendants’ last known addresses.  Id. at 192.  Attachment of the stock was the sole 
basis of jurisdiction—the defendants had no connection to Delaware and none of the actions 
that gave rise to Heitner’s claims took place in the state.  Id. at 213. 
146. Id. at 192. The statute provided: 
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all
courts held in this State, but not for the purposes of taxation, the situs of the
ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this
State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded
as this State.
Id. at n.9 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975)).
600
POST BLOOM PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2019 4:24 PM        
 
     
  
   
 
   
      
   
      
 
 
    
 
  
   
      
  
   
    
 
      
             
         
   
  
   
  
   
 
 
      
     
        
          
   
 
         
    
[VOL. 56: 581, 2019] Back to the Future 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
as a matter quasi in rem, is not subject to International Shoe’s minimum
contacts analysis.147 
Yet such an analysis “assume[d] the continued soundness of the conceptual 
structure” of Pennoyer.148 According to Justice Marshall, the distinction
between matters in rem and in personam was purely fictional and a historical
relic.149  Just as in Harris v. Balk, where the debt was used to gain jurisdiction
over the person, the stock served the same purpose for Heitner.150  Thus,
after wading through the various legal fictions that were necessary to support 
Pennoyer, the Court stated “that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny.”151 
This language represents the zenith of International Shoe.  By overturning 
Pennoyer, Shaffer made International Shoe the center of every jurisdictional 
analysis.152 But the concurring opinions of Justice Powell and Justice Stevens
indicated that maybe Pennoyer still had some life. Both concurrences suggested
that the minimum contacts analysis may not apply in cases involving real
property.153 Thirteen years later, Justice Scalia took Shaffer’s perceived 
ambiguities and ran with them.154 
147. Id. at 196.  Claims that are quasi in rem refer to actions in which the plaintiff is 
either seeking to secure a “pre-existing claim in the subject property” or “to apply what he 
concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.”
Id. at 199 n.17 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)). 
148. Id. at 196. 
149. See id. at 212. 
150. Id. at 209. 
151. See id. at 198–211 (discussing the evolution of personal jurisdiction), 212. 
152.  See Silberman, supra note 3, at 34–35 (describing Shaffer as Pennoyer’s death 
knell). 
153.  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In the case of real property, 
in particular, the preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction
arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard . . . .”);
id. at  219 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I agree with  Mr.  Justice  Powell that [the opinion]
should not be read to invalidate quasi in rem jurisdiction where real estate is involved. I
would also not read it as invalidating other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction
over persons . . . .”).
154. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620–21 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(describing Shaffer as applying the minimum contacts analysis only to quasi in rem actions). 
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IV. A RETURN TO PENNOYER
Between 1990 and 2017, the Supreme Court decided seven personal
jurisdiction cases, with six of those decisions coming since 2011.155 These 
decisions mark a significant departure from the Court’s International Shoe
jurisprudence discussed in Part III. This Part analyzes the ways in which 
these decisions have revived Pennoyer’s traditional approach to personal 
jurisdiction. Section A discusses Burnham v. Superior Court, where the 
Court explicitly based its holding on traditional concepts of jurisdiction.  
Section B describes how the Court’s curtailment of general jurisdiction has
essentially made it a question of the defendant’s status. Finally, Section
C explains the erosion of the reasonableness calculus in specific jurisdiction. 
A. Tradition as Due Process 
In January of 1988, Dennis Burnham was personally served with a summons
and a petition for divorce while visiting the state of California.156  Burnham
had been in the state on business and proceeded to spend the weekend with
one of his children, who had moved to California with his wife following 
their separation.157 A divided Supreme Court determined that California
could exercise general jurisdiction over Burnham because he was personally
served with process in the state.158 The Court achieved this result by first
engaging in an extensive historical analysis of the practice and then narrowly
recasting the premise of International Shoe.159 
Relying on Shaffer’s admonishment that all assertions of jurisdiction must 
be analyzed in light of International Shoe, Burnham argued that California’s
exercise of jurisdiction offended due process given his lack of contacts
155. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017); 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 279 
(2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121–22 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–20 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd.  v.  
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (plurality opinion); Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607 (plurality
opinion).
156. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion). 
157. Id. The Burnhams separated in July 1987. Id. at 607. In October of that year, 
Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey state court, but he did not obtain summons
nor did he attempt to serve Mrs. Burnham.  Id. 
158. See id. at 607, 619 (upholding jurisdiction over claims unrelated to Burnham’s 
activities in the state based on personal service of process).  Justice Scalia authored the opinion 
and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy.  Id. 604. 
159. See id. at 610–16 (reviewing the history of courts exercising jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants who are served while physically present in the state); id. at 616– 
19 (reframing International Shoe). 
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with the state.160 According to Justice Scalia, Burnham’s argument constituted
a “thorough misunderstanding” of the Court’s jurisprudence.161  In Justice
Scalia’s estimation, International Shoe merely abolished the legal fictions 
of consent and presence to reveal the underlying truth that “[d]ue process
does not necessarily require the States to adhere to the unbending territorial
limits on jurisdiction” from Pennoyer.162 From here, Justice Scalia went 
on to conclude that “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes 
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system.”163 Following this rational, real property attachment comports with 
due process because it is also a continuing tradition of American law.164 
Although Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, he rejected Justice 
Scalia’s tradition-bound analysis and continued to adhere to International 
Shoe.165 In fact, Justice Brennan believed that the Court’s decisions in 
International Shoe and Shaffer mandated a more holistic inquiry.166  Justice
Brennan reasoned that under International Shoe, Burnham’s voluntary
presence in California constituted purposeful availment because he reaped 
the benefits of the state’s protection and economy while he was there.167 
Moreover, given advancements in communication and travel, it would not
be unfair or unreasonable to require him to travel to California to defend the 
suit.168 
160. Brief for Petitioner at 16–23, 46–49, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) 
(No. 89-44). 
161. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616 (plurality opinion).
162.  Id. at 618. 
163. Id. at 619. 
164. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–26 (1878) (discussing cases in which 
attachment of property served as the basis of jurisdiction), overruled in part by Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 42, § 1070 
(noting the common law history of actions in rem and quasi in rem).
165. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629–30 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence.  Id. at 628. 
166. See id. at 629 (finding “reliance solely on historical pedigree” “foreclosed” by
International Shoe and Shaffer).
167. See id. at 637–38. Specifically, “[Burnham’s] health and safety are guaranteed by
the State’s police, fire, and emergency medical services; he is free to travel on the State’s 
roads and waterways; he likely enjoys the fruits of the State’s economy as well.” Id.
168. Id. at 638–39. 
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Although Justice Scalia’s tradition-focused due process analysis garnered 
only three votes, Burnham represented an early and important sign of Pennoyer’s
resurgence and International Shoe’s demise.169 
B. General Jurisdiction as a Matter of Status 
In International Shoe, the Court contemplated situations in which a 
corporation’s activities within a state are so continuous and systematic as
to justify causes of action unrelated to those activities.170 First in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidating Mining Co. and later in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Court affirmed that general jurisdiction may
be supported where a corporation has continuous and systematic contacts 
with the forum.171 However, the Court’s most recent decisions have shifted
the focus away from the contacts analysis to one focused on the corporation’s 
status.172 
In Daimler AG v. Bauman and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown, the Court held that general jurisdiction may only be asserted
over a corporation where its “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home.”173 The Court cited
169. See Vandevelde, supra note 121, at 314–15 (describing Burnham as an opportunity
for the Court’s conservative Justices—Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy—to attack International 
Shoe’s flexible approach to jurisdiction). 
170. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945). 
171. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (permitting 
Ohio to exercise jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the corporation’s activities in the
state given continuous and systematic contacts); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–17 (1984) (denying jurisdiction because the company’s contacts
were not “continuous and systematic general business contacts”). 
172. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (finding a corporation’s
place of incorporation and principal place of business to be the paradigms of general
jurisdiction (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 
(2011))).
173. Id. at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). It should be noted that both 
cases involved foreign defendants.  See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 120–21 (noting Daimler is a 
German public stock company with headquarters in Stuttgart); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920
(noting that the various Goodyear subsidiaries named in the suit are incorporated in
Luxembourg, Turkey, and France). In Goodyear, the parents of two children who were killed 
in a bus accident in Paris, France attempted to sue Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation,
and its foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. Goodyear USA 
did not challenge jurisdiction, but the foreign subsidiaries did. Id. The Supreme Court
struck down North Carolina’s finding of jurisdiction. Id. at 920. In Daimler, neither the 
defendants nor the plaintiffs were from the United States. 571 U.S. at 120. The Argentinian
plaintiffs alleged that Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary had “collaborated with state security forces
to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill” employees of the subsidiary during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”
Id. at 121. The plaintiffs based jurisdiction on Mercedes-Benz USA’s (MBUSA) contacts with
California. Id. MBUSA is a Daimler subsidiary “incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in New Jersey.”  Id.
604
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International Shoe for this proposition, but in fact, International Shoe said
nothing about the corporation being at home.174 Further, neither Helicopteros
nor Perkins employed this language.175 Both cases merely emphasized that
the contacts must be continuous and systematic to support general 
jurisdiction.176 
This idea that the corporation must be at home in the state harkens back
to Pennoyer v. Neff, where the Court considered incorporation within a
state as representing consent to the state’s regulation of status.177  Thus by
limiting general jurisdiction to a corporation’s place of incorporation, its
principal place of business, or states in which it is essentially at home, the
Court is really looking at the corporation’s status rather than its contacts.178  In 
fact, the Court said it would be an “exceptional case” for a corporation to
be at home outside of its place of incorporation or principal of place of
business.179 Thus, in Daimler, the Court analyzed the corporation’s contacts 
174. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (citing to International Shoe); Goodyear, 564 U.S.
at 919 (citing to International Shoe). But see Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (noting instances 
“in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities”).
175. See generally Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. While the word 
“home” appears in Perkins, it has nothing to do with the corporation’s home. See Perkins, 
342 U.S. at 447–48.  The Court merely notes that the president of the company returned to his 
home. See id.
176. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (“Even when the cause of action does not arise 
out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not 
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there
are sufficient contacts . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445–46 (discussing
precedent related to the “continuous and systematic” activities requirement). 
177. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1878) (“[A] state, on creating 
corporations . . . may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their
obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other than personal 
service upon their officers or members.”), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). 
178. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137–38 (rejecting general jurisdiction “in every state 
in which a corporation ‘engages in substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’”
(quoting Brief for Respondents at 16–17 & nn.7–8, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 
(2014) (No. 11-965))). In fact, the Court has not even defined what constitutes a corporation’s
principal place of business for purposes of the jurisdictional analysis. Steinman, supra note 5,
at 1411 n.58. However, it is assumed that the test put forward for corporate citizenship in
federal diversity cases applies. Id.; see also Hertz Corp v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93
(2010) (defining the principal place of business as the corporation’s “nerve center”).
179. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19. 
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with the forum state in light of its greater affiliations with the place of
incorporation and principal place of business.180 
The Court’s decision in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell reveals how limiting 
the general jurisdiction standard has become. Unlike the defendants in
Daimler and Goodyear, which were both foreign corporations, BNSF is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas.181  Two
plaintiffs sued BNSF in Montana seeking compensation under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 for workplace injuries they suffered
while employed by the company.182 Utilizing the at-home test articulated 
in Daimler and Goodyear, the Court struck down Montana’s exercise of
jurisdiction as inconsistent with due process.183 The Court reached this
conclusion despite finding that BNSF employs approximately 2,100 people, 
owns over 2,000 miles of railroad track, and runs an automotive facility in 
Montana.184 
Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court’s at home test replaced 
International Shoe’s “nuanced contacts analysis backed by considerations
of fairness and reasonableness” with “rote identification of a corporation’s 
principal place of business or place of incorporation.”185  Moreover, Justice
Sotomayor critiqued the majority’s use of the comparative contacts analysis
that appeared in Daimler, noting that no such comparisons were made in
International Shoe.186 She recognized that such an analysis makes it “virtually
inconceivable that [large multistate or multinational corporations that operate
across many jurisdictions] will ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any
180. See id. at n.20 (“General jurisdiction [] calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”). Justice Sotomayor, who concurred in
the opinion based on her assessment of the reasonableness factors, described the majority’s
approach as “too big for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 143–46 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
judgment).
181. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017); Daimler, 571 U.S.
at 120–21 (noting Daimler is a German public stock company with headquarters in Stuttgart); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011) (noting that 
the Goodyear subsidiaries named in the suit are incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and 
France).
182. See BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1554.  Neither plaintiff was from Montana, nor did the 
injuries take place in Montana. Id.
183. Id. at 1558–59. 
184. Id. at 1554. BNSF had also recently invested almost $500 million in the state.
Civil Procedure—Personal Jurisdiction—BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
333, 339 (2017). 
185. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
186. Id. at 1561; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (“General jurisdiction [] 
calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. 
A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of 
them.”).
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location other than their principal places of business or of incorporation.”187 
As a result of the at home test, general jurisdiction over corporations has 
been reduced to a question of status. 
C. Specific Jurisdiction 
In addition to curtailing general jurisdiction, the Court’s recent cases
have also narrowed acceptable exercises of specific jurisdiction. Perhaps 
the most egregious example of this trend is J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro.188 Robert Nicastro filed a products-liability suit against J.
McIntyre Machinery (McIntyre UK), an English corporation, after cutting 
off four of his fingers while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured
by the company.189 Nicastro sued McIntyre UK in New Jersey, where the
accident took place.190 The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction because the accident happened in the state
and based on its understanding of the stream of commerce theory.191 
In a plurality decision, six justices held that New Jersey’s exercise of 
jurisdiction violated due process.192 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
began with what he perceived to be the “principal inquiry” in stream of 
commerce cases—“whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention
to submit to the power of the sovereign.”193 Although McIntyre UK targeted 
187. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188.  564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
189. Id. at 878, 894 (plurality opinion). 
190. Id. at 878. 
191. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d, 
564 U.S. 873 (2011). The New Jersey Supreme Court devoted nearly ten pages of its decision 
to analyzing the dueling conceptions of the stream of commerce theory that emerged from
Asahi. See id. at 581–91. Under New Jersey’s stream of commerce theory: 
A foreign manufacturer will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if it knows or 
reasonably should know that through its distribution scheme its products are 
being sold in New Jersey. . . . The focus is not on the manufacturer’s control of
the distribution scheme, but rather on the manufacturer’s knowledge of [it] . . . .
Id. at 591–92 (citing Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 508 A.2d 1127, 
1137 (N.J. 1986)). Thus, McIntyre UK was subject to jurisdiction because it had established 
a U.S. distributor to target the entire U.S. market, including New Jersey. Id. at 593. 
192. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 879–87 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 877. Justice Breyer 
filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Id. at 887 (Breyer & Alito, JJ., 
concurring). 
193. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion). As Justice Ginsburg noted, Kennedy’s submission
theory “seems scarcely different from the long discredited fiction of implied consent.” Id.
at 901 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the entire U.S. market and even established a U.S. distributor, the plurality 
found that McIntyre UK had not purposefully availed itself of the forum.194 
But as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the fact that the machine 
ended up in New Jersey was not “random[] or fortuitous[]” but a result of
McIntyre’s deliberate connections to the United States.195 Moreover, New 
Jersey’s status as the primary U.S. market for scrap metal made it especially
likely that its metal shearing machines would end up there.196 While 
foreseeability alone does not constitute purposeful availment, under World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, a corporation’s efforts to target a
market, either “directly or indirectly” make it amenable to suit.197 
Moreover, the reasonableness factors set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen
also pointed towards maintenance of the suit.198 First, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court articulated the state’s manifest interest in litigating a products liability
suit involving injury to one of its citizens.199 Second, requiring Nicastro
to travel to England to seek relief for an injury that took place in New 
Jersey made little sense, especially given McIntyre UK’s international reach.200 
If McIntyre UK could send its agents to trade shows all across the United 
States, requiring it to defend suit in a single state hardly seems burdensome.201 
Under no “measure of reason and fairness” would New Jersey’s exercise
of jurisdiction create an undue burden for a company that sought to market
its products “anywhere and everywhere in the United States.”202 
194. Id. at 886 (plurality opinion). McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. served as the 
exclusive U.S. distributor from around 1995 until filing for bankruptcy in 2001. Id. at 896 
& n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
195. Id. at 898. 
196. See id. at 895 (noting that New Jersey processed 30% more scrap metal than its 
nearest competitor).
197. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (emphasis added). 
198. See id. at 292 (listing the “forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute . . . ;
the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . ; the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies” as relevant
factors in the reasonableness inquiry (citations omitted)).
199. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 590–91 (N.J. 2010),
rev’d, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
200. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
201. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 591 (“If it is not inconvenient for the principals of a
company to attend trade conventions and conduct business meetings with an independent 
distributor in this country for the purpose of marketing its products, then it should not be 
too great a burden to defend a lawsuit here when one of its defective products causes serious 
bodily injury.”). Between 1990 and 2005, McIntyre officials, including the company president,
attended events in Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Francisco.
Id. at 579. 
202. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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But according to Justice Kennedy, “jurisdiction is in the first instance a 
question of authority rather than fairness.”203 Under Pennoyer, that certainly 
was true, but ever since International Shoe, fairness had been a central
concern of the jurisdictional analysis.204  In McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., a single contact between the defendant and the forum had
supported jurisdiction because the Court recognized that changes in the
economy had broadened the reach of corporate defendants.205 Those changes 
only intensified in the five intervening decades between McGee and McIntyre. 
But just as the Court was willing to revert to tradition in Burnham v. Superior
Court, it did so again in McIntyre.206 
The Court further narrowed permissible exercises of specific jurisdiction 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court.207 A group of 678 plaintiffs, 
86 of whom were California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS)
in California state court seeking damages for injuries they allegedly suffered 
from taking the drug Plavix.208 Initially, the California courts found BMS
subject to general jurisdiction, but after the Court’s decision in Daimler, 
jurisdiction was reframed as specific.209 
203.  Id. at 883 (plurality opinion).
204. See id. at 903 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction
over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime 
place to reason and fairness.”). 
205. 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (describing a “clearly discernable” trend of “expanding 
the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents”).
206. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion) (relying on Burnham for the 
proposition that “jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness”).
It should be noted that Justices Breyer and Alito did not join in Justice Kennedy’s reasoning. 
Id. at 893 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  They believed that the case did not “implicate
modern concerns,” and was an “unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that 
refashion basic jurisdictional rules.” Id. 890. Interestingly, the concurring justices believed the
New Jersey Supreme Court had employed a “new approach to personal jurisdiction.” Id.
at 892. But as Justice Ginsburg noted, both Asahi and World-Wide Volkswagen support
the New Jersey court’s analysis. See id. at 906 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
208. Id. at 1777–78.  Plavix is a prescription blood thinner that is manufactured and
sold by BMS. Id. at 1778. The plaintiffs alleged that Plavix caused “bleeding, bleeding
ulcers, gastrointestinal bleeding, cerebral bleeding, rectal bleeding, heart attack, stroke,
hemorrhagic stroke, subdural hematoma, thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, and death.” 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 U.S.
1773 (2017).
209. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 883. Specifically, the California Supreme Court 
held: 
The United States Supreme Court’s at home rule for general jurisdiction over a 
corporation, as articulated in Goodyear and Daimler . . . defeats the nonresident 
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Utilizing a sliding scale analysis, the California Supreme Court found 
that specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents claims was appropriate because
BMS’s “wide ranging” contacts “more readily” created a connection with
the forum.210 BMS’s contacts with California included: marketing and 
promoting Plavix in the state; employing 250 sales representatives in the 
state; contracting with McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in
San Francisco, for Plavix’s distribution; operating research and laboratory
facilities in the state; and maintaining a lobbying office in the state capitol.211 
The court reasoned that these extensive contacts, combined with the fact
that all of the plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from the same drug, required less 
of a direct connection between BMS’s California activities and the plaintiffs’
claims.212 
The U.S. Supreme Court did not subscribe to this analysis.  Instead, it 
found no adequate relationship between the nonresidents claims and the
litigation because “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, 
plaintiffs’ claim that California may assert general jurisdiction over BMS. BMS
may be regarded as being at home in Delaware, where it is incorporated, or perhaps 
in New York and New Jersey, where it maintains its principal business centers.
Although the company’s ongoing activities in California are substantial, they fall far 
short of establishing that [it is] at home in this state for purposes of general 
jurisdiction.
Id. In finding specific jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court specifically discussed
the Daimler majority’s response to Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion. See id. at  
884–85 (“[G]iven the many decades in which specific jurisdiction has flourished, it would 
be hard to conjure up an example of the ‘deep injustice’ Justice Sotomayor predicts as
a consequence of our holding that California is not an all-purpose forum for suits against
[Daimler].” (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 157 & n.10 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in the judgment))). 
210. Id. at 889 (quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1098 (Cal. 
1996)).
211. Id. at 879, 884, 886. BMS also sold $918 million worth of Plavix in the state
between 2006 and 2012. Id. at 879. Based on these activities, the California court held
that there was “no question” that BMS purposefully availed itself to the state. Id. at 886. 
212. See id. at 889. Specifically, the court found that “BMS’s forum contacts, including 
its California-based research and development facilities, are substantially connected to the
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims because those contacts are part of the nationwide marketing 
and distribution of Plavix, [the] drug . . . that gave rise to all the plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. 
Given the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in this area, the circuit courts have taken
varying approaches. See John V. Feliccia, Note, Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court: Reproaching the Sliding Scale Approach for the Flexible Fault of Sliding Too Far, 
77 MD. L. REV. 862, 878–85 (2018). Relying on causation concepts from torts, most
circuits employ some version of the “but-for” test—that is, but for the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum, the claim would not have occurred.  Id. at 878–79.  Other circuits modify
this approach by requiring proximate cause to prevent too much attenuation between the 
contacts and the claims.  Id. at 880–82.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also relies on 
proximate cause, but as it relates to a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s activities
and the cause of action. Id. at 882–84. Finally, other circuits employ a sliding scale approach 
to the attenuation analysis. See id. at 884. 
610
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did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, 
and were not injured by Plavix in California.”213  The majority’s concern
about the place of injury represents a marked departure from McIntyre, 
where the fact that the plaintiff sawed off four of his fingers in New Jersey
was considered irrelevant.214 
Furthermore, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., the Court had held
that the plaintiff need not have minimum contacts with the forum state.215 
In that case, even after acknowledging that the plaintiff suffered the bulk 
of her harm outside of the state, the Court upheld jurisdiction based on the
defendant’s contacts with the market.216  Those contacts—monthly sales 
of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines—pale in comparison to BMS’s contacts
with California.217 Moreover, in Keeton, the Court cited the defendant’s
“nationwide audience” for the proposition that there is “no unfairness in 
calling it to answer for the contents of that publication wherever a substantial
number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”218  One would think
that this logic should also apply to BMS since it marketed Plavix nationwide
and sold $918 million worth of it in California.219  Yet because Keeton was
a libel action, the majority believed it was “amply distinguishe[d]” from 
BMS.220 
Moreover, the majority’s reasoning is inconsistent with the 2014 case
Walden v. Fiore, in which the Court held that the place of injury is relevant
only as far as it proves minimum contacts between the defendant and the
213. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
214. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878, 885–87 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (acknowledging that the accident happened in New Jersey but finding
a lack of purposeful availment because McIntyre UK targeted the U.S. market as a whole,
not New Jersey specifically).
215. 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). 
216. Id. at 780–81. 
217. See id. at 772 (“[Defendant’s] contacts with New Hampshire consist of the sale 
of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in that State each month.”); see also
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 879 (“BMS sold almost 187 million Plavix pills to distributors 
and wholesalers in California in 2006–2012.”). 
218. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781. 
219. See Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 879, 889. 
220. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782. Specifically, the Court described Keeton as
determining “the scope of a claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the 
State, not, as in this case, jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no in state injury and 
no injury to residents of the forum state.” Id. Conversely, Justice Sotomayor recognized 
that “this is a distinction without . . . difference: In either case, a defendant will face liability 
in a single State for a single course of conduct that has impact in many States. Keeton informs 
us that there is no unfairness in such a result.” Id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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forum.221  The Walden plaintiffs, who were Nevada residents, argued that
Nevada had jurisdiction over their claim because that is where they suffered 
their injury.222 A unanimous Court flatly rejected the plaintiffs argument,
holding that “[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced
a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s contact connects 
him to the forum in a meaningful way.”223 
The Bristol-Myers majority, however, cited Walden for the proposition 
that the injurious conduct must have occurred in the forum state.224  But
in fact, Walden stands for unremarkable proposition that the defendant
must purposefully avail itself of the forum.225  Unlike the defendant in 
Walden, BMS clearly purposefully availed itself of the forum by establishing 
numerous connections with the state.226 
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor indicated that the majority’s decision 
represents a significant curtailment of specific jurisdiction in the name of 
“territorial limitations” on state power.227 By naming federalism as the
“decisive” inquiry,228 the Court elevated traditional notions of power above
221. 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014) (rejecting a Nevada court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
because the defendant had no contacts with the forum other than the fact that plaintiffs’ 
injury occurred there). 
222. Brief for Respondents at 14–16, Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (No. 12-
574). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by knowingly filing a false affidavit 
that resulted in the seizure of $97,000 cash. See id. at 1–2, 6. All of the conduct giving
rise to the claim had occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, where the plaintiffs were waiting to
board a flight to Las Vegas, Nevada. See id. at 1–4. When the plaintiffs arrived in Nevada, 
they compiled documentation that indicated they had legally obtained the cash through 
their careers as professional gamblers. See id. at 4. Despite this evidence, the defendant 
filed an affidavit in an attempt to institute forfeiture proceedings.  Id. at 5.
223. Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added). Relying on Calder v. Jones, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction because the 
defendant’s conduct was “expressly aimed” at Nevada residents. Id. at 282 (citing Calder 
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).  The Court distinguished the case based on the fact that Calder
was a libel action and the defendants had “ample contacts” with the forum. Id. at 287–88, 290. 
224. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (“[A]s in Walden, all the conduct 
giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere.”). 
225. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing Walden as concerning purposeful
availment, not whether the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum).
226. Compare Walden, 571 U.S. at 279 (noting that defendant’s only contact with
Nevada was his allegedly tortious conduct aimed at Nevada residents), with Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 879, 884, 886 (Cal. 2016) (describing BMS’s
marketing, lobbying, research, employment, and contract connections with California),
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
227. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784, 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority’s holding as allowing territorial limitations to trump fairness to the parties).
228. Id. at 1780 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
294 (1980)). It is not even clear that World-Wide Volkswagen supports this proposition
because in a later case the Court held:
612
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fairness.229 But this analysis is utterly inconsistent with International Shoe, 
for as the Court acknowledged in Shaffer v. Heitner, “[t]he relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually
exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest,
[are] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”230 
International Shoe’s “immediate effect . . . was to increase the ability of the
state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.”231 
By emphasizing federalism and territorial limitations on state power, 
the Court has breathed new life into Pennoyer’s antiquated notions of 
jurisdiction.232  Given that specific jurisdiction is “the centerpiece of modern 
jurisdiction theory,” and the Court’s curtailment of general jurisdiction,
plaintiffs appear to have little course against nonresident defendants.233 
V. CONCLUSION
In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court innovated personal jurisdiction 
analysis by making it an issue of constitutional concern under the Due 
Process Clause. Yet, despite this innovation, the Court adhered to traditional 
and territorially-bound notions of state power. Pennoyer’s framework began
to fray as people became increasingly mobile and the economy became
increasingly national. As a result, the Court had to develop various legal 
fictions to adapt Pennoyer to new realities.
The Court’s decision in International Shoe marked the beginning of a
new jurisdictional era. No longer would the Court be concerned with boundaries, 
presence, and consent. Instead, jurisdiction would be determined by the 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause.  That Clause is the only source of the personal 
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. 
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 900 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982)). 
229. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
230.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (citation omitted). 
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 128 (2014) (describing specific jurisdiction
as the “centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011))); see Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788–89 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The effect of the Court’s opinion today is to eliminate nationwide 
mass actions in any State other than those in which a defendant is ‘essentially at home.’”).
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defendant’s contacts with the forum. Due process became a matter of 
fairness—so long as “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 
would not be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction, then due process
was satisfied.
Although this doctrine underwent significant refinement through the  
years, International Shoe continued to drive the Court’s analysis. But 
beginning with its decision in Burnham, the Supreme Court has launched a
revival of Pennoyer’s focus on traditional bases of jurisdiction. This trend 
only accelerated with the Court’s decisions in McIntyre, Daimler, and
Bristol-Myers. 
In McIntyre, the Court asserted that authority is the central concern of 
the jurisdictional analysis, not fairness. Daimler’s at home test has reduced
general jurisdiction to a question of status—whether a defendant is incorporated 
within a state or has its principal place of business there. And in Bristol-
Myers, federalism became the animating concern of specific jurisdiction.
The result of these decisions is that people visiting a state for a day may
be subject to general jurisdiction so long as they are personally served 
with process, but a multinational corporation with numerous contacts with
a state can only be sued under general jurisdiction at home. At the same
time, it has become increasingly difficult to predict whether a corporate
defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction even when its product grievously
injures an individual in the targeted forum.  Such an absurd system indicates
that the fairness analysis that was central to International Shoe has given
way to Pennoyer’s traditional notions of power and consent. Personal
jurisdiction analysis has truly gone backwards. 
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